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The previous three chapters have analyzed the
processes that appear to generate fluctuations
within the complex of events central to pur-
chasing and stock-carrying functions. Thus
they concern primarily the first of the two
sets of problems mentioned at the outset—
the dynamics of inventory fluctuation viewed
as a syndrome of causally interrelated phe-
nomena. This chapter focuses on the second
set of problems: how stocks and associated
activities participate in economic instability.
The central fact about the objectives, prob-
lems, perceptions, and techniques associated
with stock carrying and purchasing is that
they tend to produce fluctuation in stocks on
hand and on order and in their rates of
change. But most other aspects of economic
life are also subject to fluctuation, and to
these instabilities inventory movements have
the usual double relationship. On the one
hand, they aie influenced by fluctuations that
are, at least in the first instance, external to
the "inventory cycle." For example, we have
previously explored how changes in levels and
in rates of change in final demand, in planned
utilization and various other shifts in costs
and in market conditions, impinge on the
process whereby stocks rise and fall. On the
other hand, the levels of stocks on hand and
on order, and particularly the rates at which
they change, impinge on other aspects of the
economy (including the ones just mentioned)
and the manner in which they fluctuate.
The specifics of the impact differ, of course,
for each aspect, and therefore cannot be ex-
amined here. It will, however, be instructive
to make use of a general framework for busi-
ness fluctuation and describe how the events
primarily associated with the inventory-pur-
chase complex join the configuration. I dis-
cuss first the timing of the events central to
inventory-purchase movements, and second the
amplitude of their impact on earlier as con-
trasted with later stages of production. The
last section surveys how the inventory-pur-
chase syndrome plays into the process whereby
the forces of contraction cumulate and mode-
rate, how expansion sets in, develops, and re-
cedes.
BUSINESS CYCLE PATTERNS OF INVENTORY WAVES
Since World War II, many economists have
felt that fluctuations in stocks have played
a more dominant role in business fluctuation
at large than previously had been the case.
The reason is rather that other sources of
instability have moderated than that inven-
tories are becoming more unruly. It is not
surprising, then, to find a high order of con-
formity to the National Bureau business cycle
reference chronology of the activities involved
in purchasing and inventory fluctuation.
Three Characteristics
Conformity: Table 42 gives reference cycle
timing measures for the five series most cen-242 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 42
Average Business Cycle Reference Timing of Materials Stocks and Purchasing,
Durable Goods Manufacturers and Department Stores,
Median Leads
Mo
(—) Or Lags (+), Number Of
nths Matched Turns
At Peaks At Troughs Dur. Dept.
Mfrs. Stores
Dur. Dept. Dur. Dept.
Mfrs.StoresMfrs.Stores — + 0 — + 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Change in outstanding orders—22.5—14.0 —7.0 —9.0 8 008 00
2. Change in ownership —22.5—12.5-7.0 —8.0 8 00800
3. Change in stocks —7.0 —9.5 —3.5 —3.0 6 1 1800
4. Materials orders —10.5 —7.5 —2.0 —4.0 7 0 1800
5. Materials receipts -4.5 4.5 —1.0 3.5 5 1 2800
6. Outstanding orders —8.0 —7.0 +0.5 —2.5 8 0 0800
7. Ownership —4.5 —0.5 +0.5 —2.5 6 2 05 12
8. Stocks +0.5 +0.5 +4.0 +0.5 1 6 1 143
Average lines 1—5 —13.4 9.6 —4.1 5.5





Early Peak As High Or
•Higher Than Second Peak
Number of






(9) (10) (11) (12)
1. Change in outstanding orders 0 0 2b 4 YesYesYesYes
2. Change in ownership 0 0 1b 4 YesYesYesYes
3. Change in stocks 0 0 4 4 YesYesYesYes
4. Materials orders 0 0 2 4 No YesYesYes
5. Materials receipts 0 0 2 4 No YesNo Yes
6. Outstanding orders 0 0 2b 4 YesYes No Yes
7. Ownership 0 0 2 4 YesYes No Yes
8. Stocks 0 0 Ob 4 No No No Yes
aFor source tables, see corresponding lines of Table 43.
addition there were two extra minor specific cycle turns.12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 243
trally involved in inventory cycles and their
impact on the economy. They are rates of
change in ownership and in its two parts,
and orders for materials and their shipment
to the purchaser. The level of the three stock-
piles is also shown in the table. For both du-
rable goods manufacturers and department
stores, all reference turns during the period
examined (there were eight marked) were
invariably matched by corresponding specific
cycle turns.
Leads: Virtually all turns for the five series
lead the business cycle chronology. For the
two sorts of enterprises, eighty individual tim-
ing comparisons were made; two of these were
lags, four synchronous,' and seventy-four leads.
For outstandings proper, leads are also uni-
versal. Only for stocks proper are lags com-
mon. Average leads tended to be long, and
longer at peaks than at troughs. The difference
was far more marked for the durable goods
industries than for department stores.
Extra Cycles: The table summarizes a fur-
ther characteristic of the series. They tend to
have additional specific cycle turns at one or
both of the times when hesitations or minor
reversals in business cycles have been noted. I
refer to the two brief recessions which inter-
rupted, on the one hand, the rise to the 1948
business peak and, on the other hand, inter-
rupted the rise to the peak in 1953 after the
first impact of the Korean War. Columns 9
and 10 of Table 42 show that department
store inventory and purchase data all had
these four specific subcycle phases. The dura-
ble goods inventory data usually had them,
though often marked as a minor movement,
whereas the book value of orders and ship-
ments rose uninterruptedly during the first
years of postwar demand, though it dipped
after Korea. In general, then, for this whole
group of activities, two of the three periods
of business cycle expansion between 1946 and
1961 were interrupted by temporary setbacks.2
1Theindividual timing comparisons are given in
the source tables for each line of Table 42.
Indeed, the earlier of the two peaks in each
of the interrupted business expansion phases
was for the department store data, with one
exception, uniformly as high or higher than
the second, the one associated with the peak
in general business.
The characteristic interruptions also have
implications with respect to techniques of anal-
ysis. By using the subcycle reference scheme,
more comparisons can be made, and the tim-
ing of individual turns becomes less erratic.
These measures, summarized in Table 43,
show again the almost universal presence of
leadsfortheownership investmentdata
(columns 7 and 8) and likewise for materials
orders. The tendency for average leads to be
longer (orlagsshorter)at peaks than at
troughs is indicated (without the disruption
of the very long leads relative to the business
cycle turn in 1953).
Similarities and Differences in
Timing for the Two Groups
of Enterprises
By and large one is struck by the similarities
in the timing comparisons for department
storesand durablegoodsmanufacturers.
However, Table 43 does reveal, on closer ex-
amination, that for department stores median
leads at troughs are invariably longer, or lags
shorter, than for durables. This is perhaps no
surprise in view of the tendency for retail
sales to recover promptly during the postwar
However, the similarities and differences in
timing of events associated with the merchan-
dise buying of department stores and with the
materials buying of durable goods manufac-
turers deserve more careful study, for they
bear on the important problem of whether
2Thereappears also to have been an interruption
at the turn of the year 1961—62, but, as previously ex-
plained, my figures need a thorough overhauling in
order to deal reliably with this period.
$Comparelines 1 and 2 in Tables 6 and 15.244 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 43
Average Subcycle Reference Timing of Materials Stocks and Purchasing,
Durable Goods Manufacturers and Department Stores, 1946-62
Median Leads (—) Or Lags (+), Months
Peaks Troughs All Turns
Series
Dur. Dept. Dur. Dept. Dur. Dept.
Dept. Stores Durables Mfrs. Stores Mfrs. Stores Mfrs. Stores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Ownership
Outstandings Outstandings —12.7 —13.0 —5.0 —10.5 —7.7 —11.5
Ownership Ownership —12.7 —11.5 —5.0 —9.5 —7.7 —11.0
Stocks Stocks —4.0 —8.0 —1.5 —3.0 —3.0 —6.0
Purchase Data
Merch. Orders Materials Orders —7.3 —7.5 —2.7 —5.5 —4.5 —7.0
Merch. Receipts Materials Receipts —2.7 —4.5 —0.7 —3.5 —0.5 —3.5
Stock Proper
Outstandings Outstandings —6.0 -6.5 +0.5 —2.5 -2.5 —3.5
Ownership Ownership —4.0 -0.5 +1.0 —2.5 —1.5 2.0
Stocks Stocks +1.3 +0.5 +3.7 0 +3.0 0
Average lines 1—5 —7.9 8.9 —3.0 6.4 4.7 —7.8
Average all lines —6.0 —6.4 —1.2 —4.6 —3.0 5.6
Number Of
Matched Turns Skipped Source Tables Reference
Dur. Dept. Turns Dur. Dept.
Mfrs. Stores Mfrs. Stores
Dur.Dept.
—+0 —+ 0Mfrs.StoresTable LineTableLine
(7) (3) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Change in Ownership
OutstandingsOutstandings 10 0112 0 0 1 0 18 13 20 14
Ownership Ownership 100112 0 0 1 0 18 2 20 2
Stocks Stocks 92112 0 0 0 0 18 7 20 8
Purchase Data
Merch. OrdersMaterials Orders 90112 0 0 2 0 28 9 22 11
Merch. Receipts Materials Receipts 52312 0 0 2 0 28 2 22 6
Stock Proper
Outstandings Outstandings 84012 0 0 0 0 1 11 9 11
Ownership Ownership 7308 1 3 2 0 1 2 9 2
Stocks Stocks 1813 5 4 2 0 1 6 9 612. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 245
thereis a tendency for inventory-purchase
cycles to occur at the same time in diverse
markets. Table 44 explores the, question in
terms of direct comparisons between depart-
ment stores and durable goods manufactur-
ers for the stock and flow data, grouped
in pairs, on as nearly a comparable basis as
can be contrived.
The first eight lines refer to the same pairs
of series for which the reference timing was
given in Tables 42 and 43. The direct com-
parisons show, of course, the same tendency
for department store stocks or outstandings,
and their rates of change, to reach troughs
ahead of those of durable goods manufactur-
ers. Moreover, for rates of change, the average
leads of three or four months are very con-
sistent: average deviation ranged between 1.4
and 2.0 months for the three inventory in-
vestment series. Lines 11 and 12 indicate that
one reason for the lead may be that, at troughs,
department stores' sales also lead shipments
of all durable goods manufacturers or those
in the heavy industries. But the need for very
close control of merchandise stocks doubtless
also plays a part.
We saw in the previous tables that actions
associated with the inventory-purchase syn-
drome caused department store merchandise
orders to lead at cyclical turns as much or
more than did the materials orders of durable
goods manufacturers. Apparently, at only two
of the ten matched turns (line 4) did the
purchase orders of department stores turn
later than those of durable goods manufactur-
ers. The tendency for department store in-
ventory investment and buying to turn early
even relative to the most sensitive durable
goods manufacturers' stocks,those of pur-
chased materials, offers food for thought.
But perhaps even more interesting than the
lead itself is the regularity of the association
for the two sorts of enterprises. The series that
represent the most direct influence of stocks
on the economy as a whole are the rates of
change in the stock aggregates, materials or-
ders, and (via their influence on inventory
fluctuation) the rates of change in shipments
(sales). Of these, the timing for the inventory
investment and order data have already been
discussed. For change in shipments (lines 13
and 14), the table shows a surprisingly close
correspondence when the rates of change in
department storesalesare compared with
either shipments of all durable goods manu-
facturers or those ofthe heavy industries
only. Allowing for a lead of between two
and zero months, 79—81 per cent of the
months were in like phase for the whole
period or, because of differences in the im-
mediate postwar behavior, 83—86 per cent for
the period beginning in 1948. Peaks occur at
virtually the same time, the average deviation
for the four matched peaks are .5 and .2
months respectively. For thefive matched
troughs, none are more than four months
apart. Note that the timing is not nearly as
similar for the data proper (lines 11 and 12),
though the absence of turns in either series in
the early years boosts the months in phase for
the period as a whole (not for the post-January
1948 segment).
I might add, in view of the common as-
sumption that differencing reduces colline-
arity, that it is common for comparable data
for any of the stock and flow series for the
two sorts of enterprises to have more months
in phase when converted to rates of change
than for the data proper.4
4 percentageof months in phase was compared
for department stores and durable goods manufac-
turers as shown by first differences and by data proper
in three stock series given in lines I to 3 and 6 to 8
of Table 44, and for the flow series for which the data
proper are given in lines 9,11, 4, 10 and 12. (The
matching rates of change are given in the table only
for lines 11 and 12.) This gave sixteen comparisons—
eight pairs for percentage of months in phase for
data proper and for their first differences; using the
two periods, 7/46 to 12/61 and 1/48 to 12/61, pro-
duced sixteen pairs. Of these sixteen, the months in
phase for department stores and durables were higher
for first differences in thirteen cases, the same in one,
and smaller in two. Timing also tends to be more
nearly synchronous for the first differences in six of
the eight pairs, the same in one, and longer in one.
I have not systematically examined whether, when
other sorts of comparisons are made, the parallelism is246 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 44
Timing: Selected Series, Department Stores Compared with Comparable




P T P T P T P T P T P T
Line DurablesC 194719471948194919511952195319541957195819601961
Specific Series: Change in Ownership, Dept. Stores
1Outstandings —2 —6 —8 —3 —6 —6 +1 —5 +6 —3 +5 0
2Ownership —7 —6 —8 —3 +9 —5 +5 —1 +4 0
3Stocks —3 —5 —11 —2 0 —4 +5 0 +6 —3
Specific Series: Purchasing, Dept. Stores
4Materials, orders —12 —1 —6 —8 0 0 +6 3+14 —1
5Materials,receipts —11 —3 -4 9 —6 4 +6 3+10 —1
Specific Series: Stock Proper, Dept. Stores
6Outstandings —8 —5 —14 —8 —8 +2 —2 +7 —3 +2 +6
7Ownership —7 —4 —6 —8 —6 +2 —2 +8 —2 +4 +6
8Stocks —4 —6 —11 +1 0 —8 —7 —7 —4 —3+11 +3
Specific Series: Demand, Dept. Stores
9Orders,final
product 0 0 +4 +1 0 5 +5 +1+12 —2+10 0
10Orders, all dur. 0 0 +4 0 0 —5 +4 +1+20 0+10
11Shipments, final
product 0 0 —2 —5 —2 —9 +7 —2 +9 0
12Shipments,
all durables 0 0 —2 —3 —2 15 —2 9 +7 —2+10 0
SpecificSeries: Change in Sales, Dept. Stores
13Change shipments,
fina' product +4 —1 —2 0 4 0 —2 0 1
14Change shipments,
all durables +4 —1 —3 0 —4 0 —1 +1 0


















% Mos. % Mos.
7/46—1/48—
12/6112,/61
Specific Series: ChangeinOwnership, Dept. Stores
1Outstandings 83 1 —0.5—4.0—3.04.71.83.43.2 3 78 78
2Ownership 63 1+0.7—3.0—2.06.52.0 4.64.2 1, —2 71 75
3Stocks 622+0.7—3.0—2.55.11.4 3.53.3 —2 77 79
4Materials, orders
Specific Series: Purchasing, Dept. Stores
622 0 —1.7—1.07.62.14.94.9 —1 72 71
5Materials, receipts 820 —1.3—3.3—3.5 7.11.9 4.34.5 —3,4 71 74
Specific Series: StockProper, Dept. Stores
6Outstandings 740 —0.3—5.5 4.95.25.35.0 —2,—3 69 69
7Ownership 740 +0.7 5.13.5 4.54.2 —2 74 74
8Stocks 83 1 -4.0 —4.04.83.74.24.2 —4 73 71
Specific Series: Demandll, Dept. Stores
9Orders, final
product 262+6.3—0.3+1.03.91.93.82.9 +1 80 77
10Orders, all dur. 153+6.00+1.75.61.54.93.8 +1 71 68
11Shipments, final
product 52 1 +2.5—3.5—2.05.0 3.0 4.04.0 —2 81 79
12Shipments,
all durables 72 1+1.0—4.7—2.04.84.7 4.44.8 2 76 74
Specific Series: Change in Salesh, Dept. Stores
13Change shipments,
final product 5 13 0 —1.7—0.70.21.91.51.1 —1 81 86
14Change shipments,
all durables 423 0 —1.3—0.30.52.31.61.5 0 79 84248 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Notes to Table 44
aSpecificseriesaredatafor department
stores. They are matched against the reference
frame of the corresponding series for durable
goods manufacturers in accordance with the
standard NBER rules. A double relaxation of
rules is marked r; it applies to cases for well-
conforming series in which two like turns are
matched, though an unlike turn lies between
them. The figure is underlined when subcyele
chronologyisthe reference series,a minor
cycle in the specific series has entered a corn-
parison;or, when two individual series are
compared, a minor cycle in either series has
entered a comparison. When the business cycle
chronology provides the reference, minor spe-
cific cycle turns are ignored.The meaning of
other symbols are:
turn in the reference series does not ap-
pear in the specific series.
turn in the specific series does not appear
in the reference series.
Othere is no turn in either series in the
neighborhoodofthechronologydate.
bChronologygivestheapproximate time
when the specific turns in the reference series
occurred.
CEach linecompares the specified data for
department stores (the specific series) with the
data for durable goods manufacturers (the ref-
erence series). Also, see note f.
dThenumber of months during which the
specific series is in like phase with the refer-
ence series is expressed as a percentage of the
total number of months covered between dates
as given.
eMedian is theaverage timing of the center
two or three turns.
deviation from the median.The
"weighted" (wt'd) average is the deviation from
the median for peaks and for troughs sepa-
rately, weighted by the number of turns.
determining months inlikephase, a
timing adjustment is made which maximizes
confluence.Before counting the months in
phase, the specific series is in effect moved to
the right to allow for a lead and to the left to
allow for a lag if by so doing the percentage of
months in like phase (as rounded) is increased.
If the months in phase are as large or larger
without an adjustment, this is indicated by a
"timing adjustment" of 0.
hThespecific series for all comparisons is
retail sales of department stores since this is
both orders for and shipments of final product.
The reference series for final products is, for
line 9, orders for the machinery and transporta-
tion equipment industries and, for lines 11 and
13, shipments for those industries, Lines 10,
12, and 14 apply to all durable goods manu-
facturers.
BACKWARD TRANSMISSION OF FLUCTUATION
The rate of change in a stock and its relation
to the flows that fill or empty the stock reser-
voir determine whether fluctuation in final
demand is magnified or subdued at earlier
levels of the economy. The potential accelera-
tion or magnification can affect flows of in-
formation, such as orders; or flows of goods,
also greater for rates of change than for data proper.
For example, instead of pairing two sorts of enter-
prises, one might compare flows variously defined
(e.g., orders and shipments) or at various stages (e.g.,
shipments for final product and for materials), How-
ever, the few comparisons that were made did not
necessarily show percentage of months in phase higher
for these other sorts of relationships when represented
by rates of change than by data proper, as was the
such as shipments; or flows of activity and as-
sociated income, such as those which produc-
tion implies. Each pair of flows may be studied
in association with change in the appropriate
stock (on hand or on order). What evidence
is readily available bearing on the character
of this backward transmission of fluctuation?
case for the comparisons between the two sorts of
enterprises.
Clearly, however, it is not correct to assume for the
purposeofeconometricanalysisthatdifferencing
systematically reduces collinearity. It typically does so,
of course, insofar as sawtooth irregularities are am-
plified; but if these are smoothed, cyclical collinearity
among various first-difference series may be greater
rather than less than for data proper.12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 249
Retail Sales and Two Stages of
Production, Consumer Durables
One piece of evidence was examined in
Chapter 7—the relation between orders placed
by department stores and sales to final con-
sumers. (The latter can be thought of as
either orders by or shipments to consumers.)
We saw that orders placed by retailers for
merchandise lead retail sales by an average of
seven months at peaks and were nearly syn-
chronous at troughs (Table 22, line 12). Re-
tailers'suppliers,in other words, feelthe
downturn of business substantially earlier than
do retailers. Thus demand, defined as orders,
accelerates at peaks as it moves backward. It
also is greatly magnified. Specific fluctuations
in new orders for merchandise were about
twice as strong as those of retail sales, the
orders of consumers (see Table 23 or Table
24, line 1).
There is no way of isolating the firms that
BilUon 1957-59 dollars
CHART i8
Retail Sales and Two Stages of Production, Consumer Durable 1947—64
Note: Shaded areas represent business contractions. Specific cycle turns are marked by dots,
additional minor turns by triangles.
aRetailsales of durable goods stores deflated by retail price of durable goods (1957—59100).
b Production of automotive and home goods, FRB data. cConsumerdurable materials,
data.250 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 45
Timing: Retail Sales and Two Stages of Production, Consumer Durable Goods, 1947—1961
Section A: Months Lead (-)orLag (+) for Matched Turnsa
Chronologyb
Reference P T P T P T P T P T P T
Line SeriesC (1/47) (7/47) 11/48 10/49 (2/51) (6/52) 7/53 8/54 7/57 4/58 5/60 2/61
Specific Series: Retail Sales
1Business cycles —5 7 —22 1 11 0
2Subcycles —7 —6 —5 —7 —22 —1 —11 0
Specific Series: Production, Final Product (Automotive & Home Goods)
3Business cycles 4 5 —2 7 21 0 4+1
4Suboycles —4 —5 —B —10 —2 —7 —21 0 —4+1
5Retail sales 0 0 +1 4 +3 0 +1 +1 +7+1
Specific Series: Production, Materials, Consumer Durables
6Business cycles 0 —5_24r 0 —4 0
7Subcycles —6 +1 0.5_24r o —4 0
8Retail sales 0 0 0 0 +1 +7 +5 +2 —2 +1 +7 0
9Production,
final product 0 0 0 +11 +2 +2-3 0 0 —1
Line




Reference Matched Mediane All Turns Adjust-






Specific Series: Retail Sales
1Business cycles501 —12.7 —2.7 —6.0 6.22.95.74.6 —6,—7 64
2Subcycles 7 01 —9.0 —3.5 —6.5 5.23.04.44.1 6,—7 73
Specific Series: Production, Final Product (Automotive & Home Goods)
3Business cycles521 —3.0 —2.5 —3.0 1.83.22.52.5 —3, —4 75
4Subcycles 811 —4.7 —4.0 —4.6 4.33.84.04.1 —4,5 76
5Retail Sales 161 +2.0 +0.5 +1.0 2.01.51.81.8 +1 86
Specific Series: Production, Materials, Consumer Durab/es
6Business cycles3 03 —9.3 —1.7 —2.09.8 2.25.56.0 —1, —2,0 62
7Subeycles 413 —5.00 —2.0 6.51.55.04.0 —1, —2,0 70
8Retailsales 161 +3.0 +1.5 +1.5 3.22.02.62.6 +1,+2 88
9Production,
final product 233 0+1.00 1.23.5 2.42.4 0 83
For notes a, c through g, see Table 44.
bChronologydates are business cycle reference dates. In addition, four minor subcycle dates, en-
closed in parentheses, are added to form a subcycle chronology.12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 251
supply department stores so as to examine
orders received and placed in the next earlier
stage; accordingly, this chain of events moves
out of sight.
However, three stages can be compared for
home goods (including major appliances) and
automobiles. Chart 18 depicts the physical
quantities of goods moving to consumers, and
goods completing production at the finished
stage and at the materials stage.5 Matching
information for orders is not available.6 Thus
we can examine flows of activity, but not
flows of the associated information.
Table 45, line 5, shows that retail sales in
constant dollars tended to turn rather con-
sistently a bit earlier than did production of
the finished goods. For the next earlier stage
there was no further acceleration, though re-
tail sales also led materials for consumer du-
rabies by an average of one or two months
(line 8).
Amplitude of fluctuation was magnified at
earlier stages—the average specific phase am-
plitude for production of finished consumer
durables was two-thirds again as large as that
of retail sales (Table 46, line 4, columns 1 to
3). The amplitude of materials production
was well over twice as large (line5), and
the figure would doubtless be larger had the
appropriate portion of the output of primary
metals been included (see footnote 5).
Chart 18 shows that there were spurts in
consumer buying, starting when business as
a whole reached troughs, and continuing for a
year, more or less. Their cessation constitutes
in each case a specific cycle peak. The dates
seem to conform fairly well to those of the
early thrusts that the inventory-purchase data
have exhibited. These thrusts in consumer
buying have their counterparts in more than
proportional thrusts in the output of the fin-
ished goods and materials used in their manu-
facture. The magnification on a per-month
basis is slightly greater for the thrusts than for
all expansion months (compare, Table 46,
columns 5 and 4, lines 4 and 5).
The magnification of contractions isstill
larger (column 6), but this could reflect no
more than the arithmetic of the differential
impact of an upward trend on series with
different cyclical Even so, it
suggests that an upward trend tends to cause
the backward transmission of demand to in-
tensify drops in output relatively more than
rises in output.
These figures, like the ownership and stock
data, suggest that magnification exceeds the
requirements of efficient servicing ofsales,
other things the same. To illustrate, a calcula-
tion can be made assuming, for example, that
the efficient stock-sales relationship consisted
of an incremental stock-sales ratio of 2. The
stockpile concerned would implicitly be that
of stocks of retail stores plus finished stocks
of manufacturers of the finished articles. The
average rise of retail sales during expansion
7 Consider three series. All have phases of two-year
duration and upward trends of one index point a
year. Series A has a cylical component of two index
points a year, series B one of four points, and series C
one of eight points.
Amplitude as %
Rise or Fail of Series A
5 Retail sales are deflated by the retail price index
forconsumer durables. The productionseriesare
those developed by the Federal Reserve Board. The
index for consumer materials production does not
include the output of primary metals producers.
6 Automobilecompaniesdonot reportunfilled
orders, and the company basis of reporting does not
make it possible to isolate orders for major consumer
appliances. The new divisional reports take an im-
portant step in this direction and may make it feasible
to examine for later years the patterns of sales orders
for at least the final product stage. However, the new
tabulations do not separate producers supplying ma-
terialsto the finished consumer durables industries
from those supplying them to the producer durables
industries.
Standings
Series Trough Peak Trough Expansion Contraction
A 100 106 104 6 2 100 100
B 100 110 104 10 6 167 300
C 100 118 104 18 14 300 700
Expansion Contraction252 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 46
Average Amplitude of Specific Cycle Fluctuation, Retail Sales and






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.Retail sales,
consumer durables




home goods 32.6 21.0 26.8 1.75 2.04 1.57
3.Production mate-
rials, consumer
durablesb 393 31.5 35.4 2.55 2.71 1.80
4.% final product
to retail sales
(line 2÷line 1) 155 179 164 142 161 257
5.% materials to
retail sales
(line 3'- line 1) 187 269 217 207 213 295
6.% materials to
final products
(lineline 2) 121 150 132 146 133 115
aExpressed as relatives of the average peak and trough standings for each phase. Standings are
five-month averages centered at month of turn. Averages cover four expansion and four contraction
phases starting with the trough in 1949 and ending with a peak in 1961. For retail sales there was no
specific trough that corresponded to the business cycle trough in 1949; therefore the contraction point
in that year was used instead.
bAspecific cycle phase with a trough in 1956 and peak in 1957 was ignored in order to keep the
measured comparable for the three series.
was 21.0 per cent of its average level (Table
46, column 1), and production of final prod-
ucts would presumably also need to increase
in the same proportion as well as enough to
accommodate the additions to stocks that are
required. Stocks, we assume, must increase
each month by twice the monthly increment
in sales—1.23 index points (column 4). Assum-
ing for the moment a triangular course of
sales, this means that production would have
had to rise during expansion by 21.0 index
points plus 2.46 points, or 23.5. This figure
may be a bit low,8 but contrast it with the
8Thepattern of sales is not triangular, and there-
fore its rate of change (and, by the same token, the
stock increments each month) is, at its maximum rate,
larger than 1.23. But the maximum rate of change in
sales does not typically occur at the same time that
sales proper reaches its peak, so that the combined12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 253
actual figure of 32.6. For contractions, the
difference that must be explained in terms of
factors other than the efficient sales link is far
larger still.
Durable Goods Manufacturing, Two
Stages of Production, Shipments and
Orders
For the range of commodities with which
we have been concerned there is no other
readily available sequence of aggregate data
showing sales to final users and earlier stages
of the economic processes that the goods un-
dergo. However, two of the intermediate stages
can be viewed for all durable goods.
Judging from the consumer durablese-
quence, most of the magnification took place
between the retail and final processing stage
(compare Table 48, lines 4 and 6). There is,
I believe, a reason for this which is implicit
in the difference in the acceleration process
for manufacturers and for department stores,
as described in the previous chapter. But first
let us examine the character of the relation
between the two manufacturing stages.
In Chart 19 the final-products industries,
machinery and transportation equipment, are
compared with all of the rest of the durables
group industries which hypothetically make
materials or parts used by the former group.
Needless to say, the hypothesis is a long way
from the truth, though the production data
come much closer to it than do the others.9
Table 47 shows that in terms of physical vol-
ume of output, final products and materials
have no systematic tendency to lead or lag one
another (line 5). A similar statement applies
to new orders for the two groups, although
impact is less than the total rise in sales (replacement
demand) plus the maximum rate of rise in sales times
2 (inventory investment requirement).
9 production indexes, which are compiled by
the Federal Reserve Board, are based on establishment
data, whereas the figures for shipments
and ordersare,aspreviously explained, based on
corporate reports. Also, in the FRB production indexes,
industry breakdowns are finer and construction ma-
terials are excluded from the materials group.
the timing relationship was considerably closer
than for production (line 13). For shipments,
materials tended to lead by short and quite
regular intervals (line 8). Broadly speaking,
then, the two stages move together on the
average.
The amplitude of matching specific cycle
fluctuations in the two groups of industries
are compared in Table 48. The magnification
of fluctuation as demand moves to the materi-
als stage seems quite strong in the produc-
tion data. On the average, materials undergo
specific cycle phases with almost half again as
much amplitude as that of final products (line
7, column 3). The per-month amplitude during
the periods of thrust is substantially larger
than for expansions as a whole, and more so
for materials than for final production (com-
pare columns 4 and 5, lines 1 and 2). Indeed,
for materials, 86 per cent of the entire rise
during expansions took place in the three
relatively short early periods.
When the relationships are viewed in terms
of shipments at book value, the magnification
for expansion as a whole disappears, though
it remains for the period of thrust (line 8).
New orders do not portray any of these several
characteristics.
I do not know how seriously to take these
figures. Technical difficulties might well ac-
count for disparities in the story of backward
transmission as told by the shipments com-
pared with the production data.'° But for or-
ders the differences are strong enough to de-
mand respect. Moreover, the analysis of proc-
ess that has been presented seems consistent
with the statistical evidence.
10 The underlying datafor shipments and new
orders are corporate reports, and this is, of course, far
too gross a reporting unit to provide the appropriate
industrial distinctions between materials and finished
products. For example, in the transportation equip-
ment industries, the automotive group includes auto
parts, and corporate reports include much more. The
establishment data ofthe productionstatisticsare
more nearly capable of the required separations, in-
cluding the exclusion of construction materials. The
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TABLE 47
Timing: Production, Shipments, and Orders, Final Products and Materials,
Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946—1961
SectionA:Months Lead(—) orLag (+) forMatched Turnsa
Reference
Chronologyb
P T P T P T P TP T P T
Line SeriesC (1/47)(7/47)11/4810/49 (2/51)(6/52)7/538/547/574/585/602/61
Specific Series: Production, Materials
1Business cycles —1 0 0 —4 —20 0 —11 -i-i
2Subcycles —1 0 +2 +1 0 —4 —20 0 —11 +1
Specific Series: Production, Final Product.
3Business cycles —4 +2 —2 0 —5 0 —4 +1
4Subcycles —4 1-2 -i-i —10 —2 0 —5 0 —4+1
5Production,
materials 0 0 3 +2 —1 11 —2 +4+15 0 +7 0
Specific Series: Shipments, Final Product
6Business cycles +1 +2 0 +2 —6 0 —10 —1
7Subcycles +1 +2 0 +2 —6 0 —10 —1
8Shipments
materials 0 0 0 +2 0 +5 +3+1 +1 0
9New orders,
final product 0 0 +6 +6 +7+10 +5 0 +1 0
10Production,
final product 0 0 +5 0 +2 +2 —1 0 —6 —2
Specific Series: Orders, Final Product
11Business cycles —5 —4 —7 —8 —11 0 —11 —1
12Subcycles —5 —4 —l —9 —7 —8 —11 0 —11 —1
13Orders, materials 0 0 —5 —1 0 —3 —1 —1 +4+1 +4 0
Specific Series: Shipments, Materials
14New orders,
materials 0 0 +1 +3 +4 +6 +6 +4 +6 0 +4 0
15Production,
materials 0 0 +2 0 +1 1 0 +1+11 —1 0 —2
(continued)256 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 47 (concluded)











Line SeriesC —+0 P TAll PT Wt'd meat8 12/61
Specific Series: Production, Materials
1Business cycles413 —6.00 —0.57.51.24.63.9 —1,0 72
2Subcycles 433 —4.0+0.30 7.21.34.04.2 0 75
Specific Series: Production, Final Product
3Business cycles422 —4.0+0.5—1.00.80.82.20.8 —1, —2, 0 88
4Subeycles 532 —3.3+0.3—1.01.72.72.92.2 —1, —2,0 81
5Production,
materials 442+1.3+0.70 5.93.54.54.7 0 76
Specific Series: Shipments, Final Product
6Business cycles332 —3.0+1.00 4.21.22.82.8 0 88
7Subcycles 332 —3.0+1.00 4.21.22.82.8 0 76
8Shipments,
materials 053+0.5+1.5+1.0 1.01.51.21.2 +1 88
9New orders,
final product 062+5.5+3.0+5.5 1.84.02.92.9 +5 83
10Production,
final product 332+0.50 0 3.51.02.22.2 0 88
Specific Series: Orders, Final Product
11Business cycles701 —9.0—2.5—6.02.52.83.42.6 —5, —6, —7 81
12Subcycles 901 —7.7—4.3—6.03.33.33.53.3 —5, —6, —7 78
13Orders,materials532+1.0—0.7—0.53.01.12.02.0 0 89
Specific Series: Shipments, Materials
14New orders,
materials 082+4.7+2.3+4.01.52.11.81.8 +4 90
15Production,
materials 343+1.00.70 2.60.91.91.7 0 90
For notes a to g see Table 44.12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES
TABLE 48
Assumethatmanufacturersoffinished
products receive sales orders which have cy-
clical fluctuations of a stipulated sort. Their
shipment will tend to lag orders, particularly
at peaks, when positions are extended; they
will also tend to have a narrower range of
fluctuation. The reason for this pattern in
the case of products distributed by retailers
was outlined in the acceleration model for
department stores in the previous chapter.
For heavy equipment sold to final an
important part of the work of the machinery
and transportation equipment industries, a
lead of sales orders must result from the long
Average Amplitude of Specific Cycle Fluctuation, Final Products and
Mat eria is, Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1949—196!
Amp! i tude
Average Phase Amplitude Per Month Amplitude





Amplitude Expansion Contraction All PhasesExpansion Thrust Contraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Production
1.Final product 29.6 12.9 20.1 .99 1.43 .87 67.0
2.Materials 38.8 21.5 28.9 1.60 2.08 1.43 86.1
Shipments
3.Final product 41.8 13.7 25.7 1.69 1.68 .94 55.7
4.Materials 34.0 17.0 24.3 1.23 2.02 1.25 94.1
Orders
5.Final product 51.9 20.9 34.2 2.58 2.79 .95 95.5
6.Materials 47.6 27.2 35.9 2.81 2.78 1.54 101.1
Percentage of Materials to Final Product
7.Production
(line 2+line1) 131 167 144 162 145 164
8.Shipments
(line 3) 81 124 95 73 120 133
9.Orders
(line 6 +ljne5) 92 130 105 109 100 162
Percentage of Orders to Shipments
10.Final product
(line 5÷line3) 124 153 133 153 166 101
11.Materials
(line 6 4) 140 160 148 228 138 123
aExpressedas relatives of the average peak and trough standings for each
five-month averages centered at month of turn. Averages cover four contractions
starting in 1948 and ending in 1961.
phase. Standings are
and three expansions258 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
periods required to complete production; con-
cerning the amplitude of the early thrust, one
can only guess that users have selected "a good
time to buy" and flashed a go-ahead signal
for plans which are already virtually ready
to go, and indeed may have been so for some
time.
But these sales orders, when received by the
manufacturer offinalproducts,constitute
forecasting instruments of considerable power.
For made-to-order heavy equipment, the char-
acter of the forecast is obvious—the order is
prerequisite to the start of production which
may take months if not years to complete.
Other ways in which orders provide forecasts
of requirements were discussed at the start
of Chapter 11. In any event, as a consequence
of this foreknowledge, producers are in a posi-
tion to place orders with suppliers in a fashion
calculated to validate whatever inventory ob-
jective for materials they choose (providing
suppliers will cooperate). There are a wide
number of alternatives, as we have seen, de-
pending on what changes, other than the
change in expected sales, are deemed to have
occurred or to be likely to occur.
For example, if physical service efficiency
were the only consideration, these manufac-
turers would presumably purchase in a pat-
tern which would cause materials to be avail-
able at the time they were needed for produc-
tion, plus whatever change in stock was re-
quired for efficient service. If there were no
reason to expect delays in deliveries of ma-
terials or changes in prices, this pattern ought
to look more like that of shipments (actually
somethingbetweenthatandproduction
starts) than like the pattern of new sales or-
ders.
On the other hand, if there was reason to
buy ahead of the actual production needs—
reason such as fear of slow deliveries, poor
selections, rising prices, and so on—the pattern
of materials orders could duplicate that of
sales orders or have even more amplitude. A
pattern of materials orders of this sort implies
thepresenceof market expectationsthat
parallel sales and evidence examined in the
previous chapter suggested that that parallel-
ism may be common. Table 47, line 13, shows
that orders for the two groups of industries,
hypothetically sales and purchase orders of
the final-products group, tend to reach peaks
and troughs at much the same time. Six of
the ten matched turns are within one month
of one another; study of Chart 19 reinforces
the picture of confluence.
In the context of backward transmission of
fluctuation, this discussion makes two points.
First, fluctuations in materials orders, which
parallel sales orders and fluctuate more than
a simple service function implies, bespeak the
presence of expected or actual market-ori-
ented materials buying which tends to parallel
fluctuations in final demand. The general
parallelism, and approximately equal ampli-
tude of fluctuation, of orders for materials and
for final products is explicable in these terms,
in view of the far smaller amplitude of ship-
ments for the two types of enterprises.
The second point is a corollary of the first.
Once sales orders take on two characteristics
—forecastingcompetence,andfluctuations
which are wide relative to those of shipments
—no further magnification of orders in addi-
tional backward sequences is essential to fur-
ther magnification or even acceleration in
shipments or production. This could result
simply from a tendency for firms at earlier
stages to match their shipments (or produc-
tion) more closely to the pattern of their
sales orders than is the case for firms at the
more finished stages.
The evidence has suggested that the double
characteristic of materials orders—market ori-
entation and sales-forecasting competence—
could very well be fonned at the final mar-
keting stage—that of retailers' purchase of
merchandise or industries' purchase of heavy
equipment for their own use.
How the physical flows actually do behave
and what sort of acceleration actually does
or does not occur is a function of the par-
ticulars, quantitatively defined, in each situa-12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 259
tiôn. Just what these are is an intriguing
question, the investigation of which requires
more trustworthy data for economic sequences
than are available.h1
The matter deserves study, for my argu-
ment implies that the pattern of acceleration
is not prescribed by time-consuming sequences
in flows of goods and changes in stocks, with
lag building on lag and amplification on
amplification. Instead, the potentially almost
instantaneous transmission of orders can pro-
vide a common stem of information upon
which thepatternofphysicaloperations
sprouts at each stage in whatever form is
dictatedbytheparticular economic and
physical problems that characterize the stage.
THE INVENTORY-PURCHASE SEQUENCE IN BUSINESS CYCLES
I have considered an inventory cycle in terms
of a sequence of causally related events re-
sulting in changes in stock on order as well
as on hand. Relative to the usual formula-
tion, this construction changes the "system"
to which inventory fluctuations belong.
On the one hand, it changes the emphasis:
it throws attention toward actions that govern
the size of stocks at the stage where the in-
flow into the stockpile is governed—the point
where materials are purchased. This perhaps
tends to underplay (but it in no sense needs
to) the traditional interest in actions at the
outflowstage—price changes which adjust
11Studyof Chart 19 and of a work table on the basis
of which Table 48 was constructed shows much variety
in the phase-by-phase relationship for orders of the
final-products and of the materials industries. If one
had confidence in the comparability of the data, these
differences and similarities would be most interesting
to explore. For these very inadequate data, suffice it
to note that the average deviation of phase amplitudes
of new orders for materials industries is much smaller
than for those of final products—an index of 10.1 in
cycle relatives (the average phase amplitude was 35.9)
as contrasted with an index of 17.6 for final products
(the average amplitude was 34.2). For shipments, on
the other hand, average deviation was virtually the
same—between 8 and 9 in cycle relatives for both
materials and final products. The amplitude of ma-
terials orders tends, ina rough sort of way, to be
large relative to that of final products for phases when
absolute amplitudes for both groups of industries are
relatively small. This accords with previously reported
observations based on outstandings-salesratios and
rates of change in ownership which suggested that
materials markets seem more routinely sensitiveto
changes inthe volume ofactivitythan do final-
products markets. The post-1960 behavior was a par-
ticular case in point.
stocks by speeding or inhibiting the outflow,
sales. On the other hand, the system to which
inventory fluctuation belongs is defined to in-
clude the placing of orders for materials and
the factors that govern their size, rather than,
simply, the receipt of merchandise. Changes
in the size of materials orders affect expecta-
tions, market conditions, prices; changes in
orders carry information, and soon affect ship-
ments, production, and consequently stock on
hand and also income flows. Accordingly, the
inventory-purchase "system" reaches out to in-
clude more directly a wider group of events
sooner than does the inventory cycle more con-
ventionally conceived.
It will be useful to place the critical events
associated with the inventory-purchase cycle
in the framework of general economic fluc-
tuation. This will serve to summarize the part
of this investigation which asks how inventory-
centered events participate in economic in-
stability. I use the convention of average or
typical sequences, thereby impoverishing de-
scription in the interest of comprehensibility.
Decline and Its Cessation
Recession is about half over. Series central
to the inventory syndrome are shown in Table
49, where their troughs are matched with the
previous business cycle reference peaks. Thus,
in the "P" columns we ask how soon after
business has started to decline each of the
series begins to improve. Obviously the ques-
tionis only relevant to the systematically260 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 49
Timing of Troughs and Peaks of Selected Series at Business Cycle
Reference Peaks and Troughsa,
1948—1961
Months Lead (—)OrLag (+) Of Specific Peak (Or Trough)


















Line Reference Phase:11 45 13 35 9 25 9 P19611961
Change in Sales
1.Dept. stores +8 +7 —1 +5 +5+13 +6 +5.5+8.3+9.0
2.Durables,




to shipments +3 +10 +4+11 +8+12 +8 +6.0+11.0+10.5
Change in Outstandings forMaterials
4.Dept. stores +8 +2+13 +2+11 +5 +3.0+10.7+9.5
5.Durables,
materials +6 +16 +4 +6 +5 +9 —1+10 +4.5+10.3+9.5
6.Unfilled orders,
final products +4 +17 +3+15 +1+13 +7 +3.5+15.0
Change in Ownership
7.Dept. stores 0 +8 +2+14 +4+13 +5 +8 +3.0+11.7+10.5
8.Durables,
materials +6 +16 +4 +6 +6 +9 —1+10 +5.0+10.3+9.5
Change in Stocks
9.Dept. stores +7 +12 +4+16 +7+23 +7 +8 +7.0+17.0+14.0
10.Durables,
materials +6 +12+11+20 +4 +9 +8.0+14.7+12.0






Months Lead ()OrLag (+) Of Specific Peak (Or Trough)














Line Reference Phase:11 45 13 35 9 25 9 P19611961
New Orders, Materials
11.Dept. stores +7 +9 +6+26 +5+24 +7 +6.5+19.7+19.5
12.Dept. stores,
trendadjusted +7 +9 +6+15 +5+14 +7+15e +6.5+12.7+14.5
13.Durables +8 +15 +5+20 +8+10 +8 +8.0+15.0+12.5
14.Durables,




term +4 +9 +1+10 —6+11 —3410e —1.0+10.0+10.0
16. Average term
proper +7 +15 +9+13 +8+20 +8.5+16.0+14.0
17.Vendor performance
D. I. +4 +11 +5+14 +5+18 —2 +4.5+14.3+13.0
18.Spot prices,
metals +7+20 +19 +7 +7 +8.0+18.0+17.0
19.Corp. profits,
durables +5 +13 +4+15 +13 +7.5+13.7+13.0
Outstandings-tsalesRatio
20.Dept. stores +7 +10 +10+16 +6 +8.5 ÷15•5b
21.Durables +10 +21 +12+23 +19 +13.0+21.0
FinalProducts, Shiprnents.or New Orders
22.Dept. store sales +8 +15 +6 +7+24 +8 +7.5+25.0
23.Orders, dur. +7 +15 +5+24 +14 +8 +7.5+17.7
24.Shipments, dur. +8 +11.0+29.7262 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATiONS
Notes to Table 49
Timingcomparisonsunder relaxed rules:
"r" signifies a like reference turn has pre-
ceded the unlike reference turn for which the
specific comparison is given. In other words,
on a direct basis, the turn lagged rather than
ledthe reference scheme. "e" refers to an
extra turn marked at the cessation of the first
risefollowingthe business cycle trough of
February1961when aspecificcycle peak
has not been located at that point. The points
are included whenever a clear leveling or drop
inactivity seems evident; many if not most
of the points would not qualify as candidates
"leading" series, and only these are covered
in the table.'2
Materials buying has been curtailed in re.
sponse to falling demand by customers of
both department stores and durable goods
manufacturers(lines11 and 13). Materials
held on order have also been reduced for some
time; indeed, curtailments had started before
recession set in and the rate at which they
are falling has already slowed up a bit (lines 4
and 5). Stocks on hand are declining and at an
accelerating rate (lines 9 and 10). But sales
are typically falling as fast or faster, so that
the number of months' sales that stocks rep-
resent has usually not started to decline (see
Charts 3 and 5). Sensitive prices are plum.
meting. Deliveries are moving toward a hand.
to-mouth basis.
In spite of all these dreary occurrences, sev-
eral things soon begin to modify the situation,
even at this early stage when contraction is
on the average about a half a year old. For
one thing, the deterioration in aggregate sales
to cOnsumers or in shipments of durable goods
manufacturers to industrial customers has be.
gun to slow up (lines 1 and 2). And we have
just seen that this influence occurs at close
to the same time in retail sales and in durable
goods shipments (Table 44, lines 13 and 14).
A deceleration in aggregate decline is likely
12 For the method of dealing with exceptions, see
Table 49, note a, paragraph on timing comparisons
under relaxed rules.
for specific major or even minor turns. In any
event,the changeinthe data beginning in
1962inhibitsaccuratecomparisonwith the
rest of the series.
specifictroughismatched with the
previous business cycle reference peak, and
similarly a specific peak is matched with the
previous trough.
bThe ratiofor department stores virtually
ceased to rise twelve months after the 4/58
trough. Replacingthe +27 by the +12 figure,
thetrough averages for turns excluding 2/61
are 13.5; including it, they are 12.7.
to imply two sorts of occurrences: the amount
of decline for enterprises whose sales are fall-
ing becomes smaller; more enterprises begin
to experience a rise. In either case the down-
ward spiral of buying is subjected to modifying
influences.
In the first case, the processes at work were
discussed at length in the previous chapter. In
a word, for department stores, the firm and
precise stock objective, and the tendency for
current sales to provide the basis of the sales
forecast, tend, as retardation sets in, to cause
buying frequently to underestimate demand
and therefore to require upward revision. For
manufacturers, the leavening influence may
work through the tendency for "excess stocks"
to decline and consequently to soften the
efforts to reduce stocks further.
In the second case, the response to de-
celeration is in a sense exaggerated by the
fact of an actual increase in sales. Increases
in sales must be frequent, since sales proper
is close to its trough. For department stores,
lows occurred between six and eight months
after the previous business cycle peak (line
22). For durables, at least new orders for
final products, the output of machinery and
transportation equipment industries reached
lows between five and nine months after the
previous peak (line23). Though the sales
orders of these goods with long production
periods have an ambiguous relation to ma-
terials procurement, it is nevertheless interest-12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 263
ing to see that they reach their lows close to
the same time as consumer buying at depart-
ment stores.
Changes tending to stimulate buying also
take place in materials markets. The number
of suppliers offering swifter deliveries has
been increasing for some time, so that now
fast delivery is the rule. This is evidenced
by the fact that the average term of purchase
orders is approaching its lowest level (line
16). Prices of materials are likewise in the
neighborhood of cyclical lows (line 18). These
slack market conditions are not a reason for
buying in anticipation of needs, but they
certainly do not inhibit the response of pur-
chasing agents to current operating require-
ments when the need occurs.
Furthermore, reduction of materials stocks
on hand and on order no longer provides
an easy substitute for new buying. The rate
of decline in total ownership has been de-
clining for a month or so (lines 7and8),
and even disinvestment in stocks on hand
has started to slow up (lines 9 and 10).
The basicpicture,then,reveals mixed
experience; but a gradual increase in the
experience of rises relative to falls in materials
buying. The rises can result from an increase
in purchasing by consumers or orders for
heavy machinery; or they can result from
correction of underprocurement, or from par-
ticular instances of optimistic expectations, or
fears of shortages. The falls can result from
declines in movement of goods to consumers,
with the wish tocurtail extended market
positions in goods on order and on hand.
The diffusion of falls in buying is waning,
and of rises waxing, until the rises are more
numerous than the falls. In consequence, ma-
terials buying proper starts to rise.
For both department stores and durable
goods manufacturers the trough in materials
buying (lines 11 and 13) occurred on all oc-
casions no less than five months and no more
than eight months after the previous peak in
business.
At this point,then, in thelate phases
ofcontraction,pricesare low,sellersare
hungry, buyers are cautious, spirits are de-
pressed, but orders start to rise.
Expansion's First Thrust
Orders rise very rapidly for a number of
months. The phenomenon of the upward
thrust has appeared at every level of this
study. It characterizes consumer buying in de-
partment stores, and in a far more extreme
form it characterizes the buying of merchan-
dise by department stores. It characterizes or-
ders for machinery and transportation equip-
ment. It characterizes about equally the orders
for materials placed by these enterprises; and
this is the more notable since the buyer of
heavy equipment must anticipate his receipt
of the equipment by orders placed many
months or even semesters in advance, whereas
no such necessity prompts the equally strong
rise in materials orders.
Materials outstanding rise not only abso-
lutely but in terms of the number of months'
sales covered, those of department stores some-
what sooner than those of durable goods man-
ufacturers (lines 20 and 21). Stocks also rise
before long. And the similarity in the cycles
in outstandings and stocks supports the logic
of a causal connection between extensions in
stock on order and on hand.'3 Before long
(for both sorts of enterprises the period av-
erages about half a year after prosperity be-
gins) materials stocks also begin to rise faster
than shipments.
Conditions in materials markets encourage
the eagerness of buyers: spot-market prices
rise; vendor performance begins to deterio-
rate; the average term of purchase orders in-
creases. Thus various parts of the inventory-
purchase complex stimulate and support one
another in a cumulative round of cause and
effect. As buying spurts upward, events and
expectations stimulate behavior that affects
markets and output, which in turn stimulates
13 See Chapter 5, summary paragraphand Chap-
ter 6, summary paragraph 5, and supporting discussions.264 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATiONS
further expectations and related behavior.
Cumulation, in other words, takes place at
the level of information, expectations, and as-
sociated action in the fashion discussed in the
previous chapter.
It takes place also at the level of actions
which affect output, which in turn affects in-
come and consequent spending along the lines
suggested in income-multiplier notions of the
conventional sort.
In view of the potential interplay of these
several autocumulating elements, the mystery
as I see itis why the upward surge is so
strong, lasts for the particular period that it
does (a bit over a year on the average), and
ceases so abruptly while prosperity is still in
sway.
The duration of the periods of thrust was
defined in Chapter 4 on several bases. For
department stores and for the durable goods
industries, outstanding purchase orders pro-
vided the criterion: thrusts covered, as that
chapter stated,"the months when, in the
course of its first specific cycle rise in reference
expansion, the rate of rise in outstandings has
reached its maximum and declined to the half-
way mark between its maximum and zero."
For a generalized set of dates, the peaks of
the minor cycles of the subcycle chronology
were used and supplemented by two addi-
tional points in 1955 and 1959, when declines
or retardations in numerous series had pre-
viously been observed. These durations are
reviewed in columns 2—4ofTable 50. Omit-
ting the two extreme entries, they range from
between 16 and 11 months, they average 14
months, which istwo-fifths of the average
period of the three expansions—35 months.
As the thrust subsides, many manifestations
associated with the inventory-purchase com-
plex tend to snub the economic expansions.
Table 50 assembles some of these facts in
convenient form. Outstanding orders and total
ownership by definition no longer increase as
rapidly as before, and thereby the speed with
which orders outrun shipments slows down.
The slower pace of extension appears in
fewer reports of lengthening order terms. It
is soon followed by, or perhaps evidenced in,
more reports of improvement in vendor per-
formance (column5).Other developments
include shortening average order terms (col-
umn 6), faIling corporate profits in durable
goods industries (column 7), and, a bit later,
falling spot-market prices of metal (column
8).
The slower rate of extension is of sufficient
quantitative importance to cause the aggre-
gate level of orders for materials to begin
to slow down very markedly about the same
time as the thrusts terminate. Physical volume
of new orders for durable goods materials
actually declined at this early point in the
long postwar expansions (column 11). And
the declines are also apparent in trend-cor-
rected orders for department stores (column
12).
A decline in new orders need not, of course,
have a counterpart in decline in output. For
one thing, inventory investment in stocks of
all sorts may still be accelerating, though in-
vestment in department store stocks and du-
rable materials has about reached its peak
(columns 9 and 10). Nevertheless, as Charts
18 and 19 indicate, declines or flat areas did
typically appear in the production or ship-
ments of durable goods materials. Shipments
to department stores by their suppliers, like
the orders placed, fell sharply in 1951 and
flattened at the end of 1955. Apparently the
hesitation reflected in the flows of information
embodied in new orders had counterparts in
the flows of goods and income.
Continued Expansion
However, other forces capable of lifting
activity were sufficiently rugged to outlast the
impact of these depressant influences. Many
illustrations spring to mind in connection
with aspects of the economy other than those
connected with the inventory data examined
in this book. A prime example is the ground
swell of consumer buying of foods and services12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 265
TABLE 50
Lag Relative to Reference Cycle Troughs of Termination of Period of Thrust




Duration of: Lag Relative to Reference Trough:
Refer- D.I. Period of Thrusta ence Vendor
Expan- Chron- Dur. Dept. Per-
Av. Term Spot
of Pur- Profits Mkt.
chase Dur. Metals
Trough sion ology Mfrs.Storesformance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order Mfrs. Prices
(6) (7) (8)
October 1949 45 16 18 16 11 15 13 15
August 1954 35 16 10 16 14 13 15 20
April 1958 25 11 11 15 18 20 13 19
February 12 13 12 12 12 7
Average for .
three phases 14 13 16 14 16 13 18














(15) (16) (17) (18)
October 1949 12 12 15 9 15 9 15 15 45 15
August 1954 20 16 10 15 20 26 24 36 29 36
April 1958 12 23 10 14 10 24 14 24 15 24
February 9 8 10 15 10 15 e
Average for
three phases 15 17 12 13 15 20 18 25 30 25
aFigures in columns 2 to 4 are from Tables 4, 5, and 14 respectively.
bFor department stores, both orders and shipments of final products are their "sales". For durable
goods manufacturers they are the new sales orders and shipments of the machinery and transportation
equipment industries.
cAll figures in this line are highly tentative, as previously explained;slighter movements than
would be selected as specific troughs have frequently been identified here.
and of the structures and services provided
by governments. But even in the area of de-
partment store sales and durable goods manu-
facturing, the movement of final products
continued to rise. Sales of department stores
continued uninterruptedly upward for an av-
erage of twenty-five months during the three
expansions. Moreover, it showed no significant
hesitation in early 1962 (see Chart 8). Ship-
ments of final products in the heavy indus-266 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
tries continued to rise throughout most of the
long expansion; the average period was thirty
months. A similar remark applies, with one
qualification, to the volume of production
(see Chart 19).'4 Here, too, itis interesting
that there was little suggestion of hesitation
in early 1962. These hardy trends in both 1952
and 1956 reactivated the procurement sectors
of the economy and produced a second round
of boosts in buying and investment in mate-
rials on hand and on order.
However, the latter episodes were somewhat
different from the first in that the market-
oriented elements seemed weaker relative to
the need for simply replenishing the supply
of materials on hand and materials flowing
into new production or sales. Charts 6,7,
10, and 11 speak to these points and are
worth a moment's review. It is particularly
interesting, in view of the traditional emphasis
on declines in profits as harbingers of cyclical
reversal, that in the durable goods industries,
in each of the three complete business cycle
expansions pictured, profits did not regain the
highs reached at the end of the first year of
expansion. It is interesting also that the recent
experience constitutes a sharp exception (see
Chart 17).
But such peaks as were attained as a result
of a secondliftinthe materials-inventory
syndrome occurred well before the peaks in
business. Summary figures were given in Table
45. In this period of half a year or a year
prior to the time when declines in general
business started, and on into the early months
of contraction, a declining rate of investment
in stocks both on hand and on order and
other market-oriented phenomena contributed
to eventual pessimistic expectations and reduc-
tion in output.
SUMMARY
Events associated with materials purchasing
tend to reverse their impact on the economy
beforegeneralbusinessreachespeaksor
troughs. Rates of change in materials stocks
proper lead by short intervals; those in stock
outstanding by longer ones.
The pattern of output that is implied causes
fluctuation at earlier stages to be stronger
than at the later stages, those close to the
consumer. The amplification is greater than
the efficient servicing of sales would seem to
require. However, there is no consistent tend-
ency for the timing of turns in production
to differ at successive stages of manufacture.
The information conveyed by new orders
undergoes a major amplification between the
buying of consumers and of retailers—the or-
ders received by manufacturers of finished
14Productionhesitated sufficiently after the Korean
War boom to have a minor turn marked at that time
(see Chart 19). However, new highs were being reached
by early 1952.
goods that supply retailers. We cannot picture
what further amplification may result as these
producers place orders for materials. How-
ever, for all durables the amplification in new
orders from one manufacturing stage to the
next does not stand out: the orders forfi-
nalproducts(machineryandtransporta-
tion equipment) do not seem to have clearly
less cyclical amplitude than do those for dura-
ble goods materials (unlike the amplitude of
production for the two stages).
The major acceleration in new orders—the
earlier turns—also takes place between con-
sumers' and retailers' buying. But this antici-
patory capability of distributors' orders, well
maintained at earlier stages, makes it possible
for production starts to increase or decrease
at much the same time throughout a sequence
of vertical stages in the preparation of goods.
Finished production may lag when the pro-
duction process is lengthy.
The force exerted by the inventory-pur.12. INVENTORY-PURCHASE CYCLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 267
chase complex differs at various stages of busi-
ness cycles:
1. Prior to business cycle peaks and during
the early months of contraction, its influence
is depressant.
2. Midway in the brief business contrac-
tions that have characterized the postwar econ-
omy, its leavening influence sets in. This in-
fluence gains force during late contraction and
still more so during the first year of expan-
sion. Then it is sharply subdued.
3. During the rest of expansion its course
varies. It tends to be depressant while the
readjustments following the cessation of the
buying surge take place. But in 195 1—52, 1955—
56, and again in 1962 the economic situation
was strong enough to overcome these elements
of hesitation and reactivate further investment
in merchandise or materials. However, the
market expansion which characterized the sec-
ond round of episodes appears to have been
more moderate than the first, though the 1964—
66 situation has turned out to be an excep-
tion in which the usual sequence has been
reversed.
This pattern reflects in part the complex
ways in which the conditions in the economy
at large affect stocks on hand and on order
and how they change. For one'thing, not only
the level but, very significantly, the rates of
change in final demand influence the appro-
priate service level of stocks. And note that
rates of change in demand tend to be sharp
at the two times when the influence of the
inventory syndrome is strong—paragraphs1
and 2 above. For another thing, these changes
in demand, given the perceptions, objectives,
and techniques available to businessmen, pro-
duce problems in enforcing objectives which
imply further fluctuations in stocks on hand
and on order.
Finally, changes take place in the relative
costs of carrying stocks on hand, and also on
order, compared with other ways of serving the
businessendswhichstocksserve.These
changes,particularlythoseassociated with
market conditions and available funds, imply
furthershiftsin ownership position. The
specifics of these several impacts on stock and
their resultant patterns of fluctuation were dis-
cussed in Chapter 10.
Let me underscore again the importance of
rates of change in this entire group of events.
It means that the influences originate in what
Arthur F.Burns hascalledthe"unseen
cycle" of diffusion, in contrast to the "seen
cycle"inaggregates proper. in-
volves the dispersion of increases and de-
creases in individual business units. It involves
also dispersion of retardations and accelera-
tions in these units.
The participation of stocks in business fluc-
tuation involves also an opposite stream of
causality—one that concerns the impact of the
inventory-purchase syndrome on the economy.
The impact takes place at two levels.
The first level involves flows of information
which influence the plans producers make, the
expectations with which they live, the tone
and substance of their negotiations with cus-
tomers and suppliers. What happens at this
level sends off further messages. The process
can produce what one might call an expecta-
tions multiplier. Occurrences at the level of
flows of information and expectation are a
second type of "unseen cycle" which, like the
cycle of diffusion, is counterpoint and often
causally antecedenttothe themes ofthe
"seen" cycle.
The second level involves flows of output
and associated income—that is,the actions
upon which aggregative economics has fo-
cused. Positive inventory investment generates
income which is not absorbed in the purchase
of the goods produced. This additional in-
come, spent and respent, stimulates produc-
tive activity and further income, in line with
multiplier influences of the traditional sort.
The two levels—that of information or ex-
pectation and of production or income flows
—often supplement one another. Thus in-
formation leading tothe expectation that268
markets may tighten can motivate an in-
crease in stock. Often they mute one another.
Thus a rise in stock that occurs because sales
were lower than expected conveys pessimistic
expectations which in turn depress subsequent
buying and All too obviously,
then, the two worlds—the world of informa-
tion, of expectations, and the world of income
and output, of action—interact.
15Thisnotion has been expressed in the context
of unintended and intended inventory investment. See,
for example, Ragnar Nurkse, "The Cyclical Pattern of
InventoryInvestment,"Quarterly JournalofEco-
nomics, August, 1952.
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